ne Je'ren t(w)eschen twee Jrense
For these groups, the identity
process is possibly, I would tentatively argue, perhaps ring-shaped rather than
linear: [note:
perhaps the left label could read ‘stigma and discrimination’ and the
right could read ‘assimilation and acceptance/tolerance’]:
This essay is a purely brainstorming essay used to critic Seth Schwartz,
Marilyn Montgomery and Ervin Briones’ The
Role of Identity in Acculturation and Assimilation of Immigrant People. As
such, this is neither a scholarly essay nor submitted for classwork, discussion
or publication, rather just some amateur theoretical doodling mosty intended to
help process and develop other concepts for further development, review or
rejection. Danke.
As part of the assumptions set into their
thesis, Schwartz, Montgomery and Briones (collecting ‘The Authors), review
prominent Modern and Postmodern definitions of their key terms (excluding
‘immigrant’ which seems to be relatively accepted): Acculturation, cultural identity, culture,
Personal identity and Social identity.
They seemingly desire a more technocratic or applied theoretical tone
rather than a theory building perspective and preference for stability and
structure in these definitions, desiring that it be “possible to define acculturation and identity in terms precise enough
to support specific theoretical propositions, calls for empirical research, and
rationales for interventions to promote identity development in acculturating
individuals.” (p 2).
A short criticism is apparent immediately
in their assumptions that acculturating is a positive goal and that they, as
members of the dominant recipient culture, are in a position to and morally empowered
to intervene. Postmodernists should be
leaping up from chairs and rattling glasses in alarm.
While they slough off liability to
theoretical criticism against Postmodernism supplied by M. J. Chandler, and R.
Brubaker and F. Cooper in a manner that would make an American Congressperson
blush, they do have a point – but one that I think we can help mitigate.
In Chandler they find, “a primary criticism of the postmodernist movement is that it
identifies problems without offering viable solutions,” (p 4). And in Brubaker and Cooper they find
justification that “a view of identity as
constantly in flux and impossible to locate does not offer pragmatic
theoretical, empirical or applied utility,” (p 4).
In as much as I am modeling a praxis-based
understanding of cultural formation and maintenance in the context of Gadamer’s
Hermeneutical Dialogue, I am both enjoying a sound critic of similar theories
and feeling the need to digest and respond to the credible criticism endorsed
by the Authors of such Postmodern approaches and understandings.
My chief concern is that the Authors are
needlessly limiting themselves for falsely pragmatic and passively culturally
aggressive purposes. The general tone of
the paper and its stated intentions (p 1) is that of a technocratic
bureaucratic call for help to better address certain perceived breakdowns of
previously established technocratic guidelines in the area of immigrant
assimilation, or lack thereof. In other
words, their aim is not better understanding or compassionate empathy but
rather the need to generate practical recommendations for real-life challenges
in Floridian cultural and immigrant society.
There is nothing wrong with this approach
apart from its history of desiring overly simplified answers to short-term
understandings of longer-term, more complicated issues. (As anyone who has stood in line at City Hall
patiently trying to explain a situation to a clerk who with similar patience
attempts to get you to simplify the matter to a yes/no scenario, has
experienced.)
The answer might be as simple as removing
the assumption of binary and linear modeling.
I recommend multi-polar graphing, as opposed to bi-polar (x,y) graphing, scattergraphing as
opposed to linear graphs and more importantly, opening their assumptions up to
include three considerations, being, that assimilation is not a linear process,
that one cannot simply abandon the consequences of reciprocal change enacted on
the host or recipient culture by the immigrant (as the Authors attempt to do (p
2), and that while their concept of intervention implies a moral or ethical
consideration, that these moral and ethical considerations are more important
and impactful than the consideration they are given by the Authors.
I find the model that they are proposing
seems to be a linear, bi-polar model in assimilation on one side and resistance
on the other. The goal is to move the
individual from the non-assimilated pole toward assimilation. Whether the immigrant is a refugee seeking
safety and stability or an economic immigrant seeking political, social and
economic self-realization, the movement is from left to right and there is a
clearly identified value judgment favoring assimilation over non-assimilation.
Rather, I would propose that assimilation
is a fluid, praxis-based process that is never complete or stabilized (based on
the experience of four state-less historic diasporas – the Jewish identity, the
Roma identity and the Anabaptist (Mennonite, Amish, Hutterite) identity), and
the odd-man out – the LGBT cultural identity.
For these groups, progress is not
necessarily linear or in one direction, nor even multi-linear, as much as it circulates
around a ring of possibilities. These
possibilities imply three ‘active’ states of ‘being’ within an identity
confrontational structure (a minority identity within a larger) for both
individuals and sub- or minority ethnic groups.
The three actions are “resting”, “avoiding” punishment or the negative,
and “seeking” the reward, the positive or growth.
The goal is not to assimilate necessarily
as much as it is to survive. I put a lot
of thought into the workings of this model recommendation and have determined
that a bi-polarity is not adequate – while the individual or minority identity
most often seeks to minimize punishment or the negative effects of
non-assimilation, it does not necessarily always pursue the rewards of
assimilation or even of non-non-assimilation behavior, but rather, often seeks
moments of active rest. Active rest is
not indecision or inertia, but rather an active rest similar to sleeping,
stopping to evaluate or to “smell the roses” or relaxing in a state of secure
contentment. In fact, it is possible
that neither assimilation nor non-assimilation are the goal for either the
individual or the ethnic minority, but rather that state of contented, secure,
restful being-ness is the actual goal.
Now, a reason that the ring structure is
important is to understand that because of the negative side-effects of
assimilation and the positive side-effects of non-assimilation, that aspect
that the Authors relegated to sociology and anthropology rather than
technocracy, going too far into assimilation can have negative impacts or even
lead to punishment while enduring non-assimilation can hit the boundary on the
reverse side and realize rewards.
To explain the ring model, just imagine
that an ethnic group pursues assimilation and is good at it, too good at it
(say the Mennonite merchants of 17th Century Amsterdam, the
Mennonite farmers on the Vistula in the 18th Century, Jewish
intellectuals in 19th Century Vienna, etc.). In pursuing the good, you go can too far in
that you are perceived to be supplanting the majority culture, which might lead
to negative ramifications such as exclusion, repression or persecution. Similarly, the Mennonites of 16th and
17th Century Amsterdam or the African-Americans of the 20th
Century South were persecuted, discriminated against or in other ways suffered
negative repercussions based on their (racial)/ethnicity, but in owning that
persecution, swung around the back of the ring until they both began to realize
the benefits of assimilating into the majority culture, but also changed that
majority culture for the better (ie civil liberties, culture of toleration, a
new methodology for recognition and attainment of minority rights, and
contributions to the joint society that progressed the whole).
Generally, however, the movement would
probably be front-weighted as it slides to and fro between the two poles of
positive benefits and experiences and negative, but it doubtful that the individual
or the ethnic community will “progress” from non-assimilation and its negative
consequences to assimilation and be permanently placed in that positive
assimilated role.
Multi-Axial Graphing |
One of the biggest problems with the linear
timeline could conceivably be simply that in the struggle to belong, there is
always another sub-group from which the majority of the persons in whatever
category you now find yourself will be excluded – in as much as those groups
exist, un-American types of ethnicity, gender, family and others will be
retained in the identity chain of the individual and the ethnic group. This is not to say that the small groups are stable
historically – they often do and will topple and shift, but access to that
ultimate level of “assimilation” will almost always be just out of reach for
most, even the most successful newcomers.
[Regardless, if this is judged to hold, then it will bear much more
research, thought and development.]
The second recommendation I that of
establishing and maintaining useful definitions. Again, I am drawing from an Anabaptist
cultural perspective on this. (I am
speaking from the perspective of the cultural minority rather than that of the
empowered or dominant host or recipient culture.)
The Authors are seeking to establish or to
endorse static, non-changing definitions of identity and culture without
granting to the Postmodern critics of such definitions that they must be
rejected in that they do not work. This
is where the technocratic aspect of the Authors context works against them. They want to retreat into a context that has
been rejected due to its limitations and then to build on that context to
develop overly simplified, ineffective definitions – not granting that future
models based on those definitions will suffer similar limitations that have
already been identified by the Postmodernists.
The difficulty that they identify with
Brubaker and Cooper in that they claim that identity,
for instance, does not exist in that it is a vague term dealing with the
scattered detritus of the components of the psychological self, (p 3), is a fair criticism.
But, and forgive me for not having access to the Brubaker and Cooper
article directly, I would extrapolate from similar readings that general claims
in that direction do not deny the actuality of identity but rather merely challenge the idea that identity is a
characteristic or an expression of the self that is outside of or separable
from the self – often identifying self as an interior psychological
phenomenon. In as much as Schwartz and
Briones work for a school of medicine, one could assume they approach this is a
psychological phenomenon.
The question as to whether an identity is
intrinsic or extrinsic to the inner self
is probably not as relevant as it seems.
Its seems to be a rhetorical rather than practical matter if one deals
with the external identity in the context of assimilation or non-assimilation,
or if one is dealing the interior self-consciousness, the impact and questions
are the same.
Regarding the second set of criticisms,
this time surrounding the term culture,
as found in Bhatia and Ram (p 3-4), the Authors find that the Postmodernists
argue that culture is “difficult to
define,” (p 3) and that one cannot easily tell what constitutes a ‘culture’
nor where one the boundaries between one culture and another can be defined, (p
3-4). Bhatia and Ram are not only
directly pertinent in their criticism of Modernist
definitions of culture, but to attempt to move beyond these valid criticisms
will rightly call any such model into question.
Where ever it is that the Authors intend to go, they need to deal with
the same criticisms expressed by Bhatia and Ram or propose a different way of
dealing with the shortcomings present in the Modernist models preferred by the
Authors for their simplicity and clarity.
The first part of my response to their
dilemma is that they look towards adopting aspects of Queer Studies (LGBT
Studies) that deal with multiple layers of identity within the gay or lesbian
minority community within a minority cultural community within the dominant Anglo-American
community in the United States (or Canada, or West). Much of this comes under the general heading
of ‘cartographies of identity’ and I
have been exploring them for possible application towards better modeling of
the minority ethnic religious identities and sub-identities within dominant
secular national cultures. I think that
this is an excellent set of models with extensive untapped potential that would
be far more useful to the Authors in an apparent ability to move beyond the
shortcomings of Modernist definitions.
The second is to learn a lesson from the
Anabaptist ethnic-religious identity structural self-understanding. In other words, if the Authors can come up
with an identity structure model to clearly and concisely delineate and define
Anabaptist culture and/or Mennonite or Amish culture, then they will have
succeeded where everyone else has failed in the last five hundred years. Jewish culture might be just as interested in
their Modernist solution in that
Jewish culture and the Israeli state have admittedly suffered from similar
constraints as the Anabaptists.
The point is not that you define cultures
by what they are or even attempt to establish a canonical set of criteria for
such a definition, but rather you focus on setting parameters to establish as
distinct bands as possible within which the various definitions and criteria
for a certain cultural identity are allowed to freely oscillate (see my Intellectual Development of the Evangelical
Mennonite Brethren Cultural Identity, 2010, Adapted Hanson-Bromeck Model
below. This diagram shows how cultural
identity is in a state of flux between two inputs. While this diagram shows a praxis model, one
might clearly infer how aspects of both boundary definitions come together, mix
and shape a new definition that oscillates between the two boundaries).
Borrowing from my friend Robert Althauser,
he readily admits that there is a debate between the various levels of Judaism
as to who is a Jew and who is not. Now,
his definition depends on positive traits – being things that must be in place
– and they are simply that either you are born of a Jewish mother or that you
have converted to Judaism. If the answer
is yes to either of those questions, then you are Jewish no matter what other criteria come into the picture. Now, he readily admits that other Jewish
groups such as the Reform have toyed with this definition to include being born
of one Jewish parent, etc., etc., so in that case you would have to move on
towards more of an Anabaptist model. But
using Robert’s simplified model, you see that while you cannot set a list of
criteria as to “what” the Jewish identity is or what it looks like, you can set
a broad band of identity structures bounded by the Jewish mother or conversion
parallel lines of legitimacy – everything is contained within those two bands.
The matter is a bit more complicated with
the Anabaptists. At present, we are
increasingly contesting assumptions that we are even defined as a religious
group, an ethnic religious group or our own cultural ethnicity that
participates in multiple or no religious identities.
So our bands are quite a bit more
complicated. We have a set of ethnic
qualifiers and a set of religious qualifiers that are more complementary than
mutually inclusive – in fact, many faith
Mennonites are not of Mennonite ethnicity and the greater number of ethnic Mennonites
have little or no interaction with faith Mennonite churches.
So we share Robert’s definition in a way –
you can be “born” Mennonite, or you “convert.”
From there, the formulas get more complicated. You can be a non-pacifist Mennonite if you are
ethnic, but if you are not ethnic and not a faith pacifist, then one could
legitimately challenge the basis on which one identifies as a Mennonite.
After that point, much of the discussion
and debate over definitions has more to do with sub-ethnic affiliations and
identities that are in fact encapsulated in the umbrella Anabaptist or
Mennonite ethnicity based on the need to define one’s self in relation to those
traditional Mennonite identifiers.
So this is more of a negative
definition. Back to the world of
Perekkadan’s Dutch Republic. There is a
perennial question as to whether or not Spinoza is Mennonite, Jewish, both or
neither. The same question applies to
many of his Mennonite friends. Regarding
the Mennonites, other Mennonites question their identity based on their own
sub-identities – but that is not, as Gadamer would put it, playing fair. All of the Mennonite-identified “Collegiants”
ie “friends of Spinoza” meet the belonging-ness criteria in both having been
born into the ethnic culture and in self-identifying with a legitimate
Mennonite faith church. Spinoza was not
born Mennonite, so he fails to meet that criteria. Nor did join a faith church – so he fails in
that regard. So Spinoza was not
Mennonite unless one expands the secular or cultural Mennonite definition to
allow for secular Jewish members.
Importantly, neither does the so-called
American Anabaptist Stanley Hauerwas meet either of these two criteria. He was not born Mennonite and he did not
convert.
Many have tried to claim that both Spinoza
and Hauerwas are Mennonite based on their similarity of cultures, shared values
and lifestyles and fellowship with Mennonites.
But where a disgruntled, non-practicing former faith Mennonite would meet our cultural definitions, being
Menno-like is not Mennonite.
Nor is this completely inapplicable to
non-ethnic religions. Take the Filipino
community for instance, you can be born Filipino or you can convert to Filipino
by immigrating to the Philippines, being adopted or marrying into the
ethnicity. Being a Filipino-phile is not
going to qualify you. These are pretty
easy boundaries to establish and contain within themselves all of the myriads
of distinctions, individualities and internal divisions that you want. But
you have to combine this concept with that of overlapping identity structures
in that you can be Filipino, American, lesbian and Mennonite, for instance, all
at the same time. But the Authors are
not going to be able to escape the reality of multiple identity structures
without calling their end results into question. Their models still have to reflect reality –
no matter how complicated that reality is.
In fact, having written this paper, I am
beginning to question the relevance of assimilation. Assimilation is seeming increasingly to be a
heavily weighted term from the days of Colonialism, Anglo-American cultural
domination and really, really scary, out of control forms of 20th
Century ethnic nationalism. Perhaps a
better concept, and one that would still fit my ring model, would that of
cultural appropriation and cultural access.
Chicago's Fluid Melting Pot |
Here’s the clincher. Both Robert and myself are dealing with ethnic-religions. Now, I am guessing that the Authors would
challenge as to whether nor not a “religious” identity is pertinent to their
paper. Indeed it is. Think about it, going back to the Filipino
culture – you are born into it or you convert through a variety of means – most
of which would grant you national citizenship into the Filipino nation. Now, once you have been born into or
converted into Judaism, Mormonism or Mennonism, you accept a certain set of
cultural obligations and realize a set of cultural or identity obligations to
yourself – including that of acceptance.
The Authors define acculturation
as “the process of cultural change and
adaptation that occurs when individuals from different cultures come into
contact,’(p 2), a definition that seems a bit simplistic. The Authors further clarify their working
definitions as “acculturation refers to
the process of adaptation along two dimensions:
(a) adoption of ideals, values, and behaviors of the receiving culture,
and (b) retention of ideals, values and beliefs from the immigrant person’s
culture of origin,” (p 2). Earlier
we have seen that they slough off the idea that the host culture is also
changed in this exchange.
While their definition fits in with the
ring model and their linear model (I still like mine better for reality’s
sake), there is still a lot of pressure to conform, adapt and adopt relative
the host country’s dominant culture with little implied pressure for the host
country to reciprocate. Yet, this is
exactly the issue that makes long-term assimilation, acculturation or simply
being able to fit in most difficult – the debate over the host or recipient
culture to allow itself to be, in fact to seek to be changed by the new cultural
immigrant. This is why subways have
signs in Spanish and English and why Swedes and the French are struggling to
come to terms to Islamic clothing restrictions.
When the Mennonites faced acculturation
ideals (in fact, many of them were already refugees from Switzerland, Belgium
and even England), they did not just assimilate. In fact, they resisted assimilation, being
willing to endure the bad (punishment) to the point that they swung completely
around the ring to the side of experiencing cultural benefits in the
Netherlands – being tolerance, material prosperity and a positive Pietist
impact on an otherwise darkly Calvinist society.
Cutting it short, the conversion/birth
model establishing distinct bands within which oscillating brands of
personalized cultural identity structures oscillate seems to augment rather
than limit the Authors practicality.
These bands can overlap other bands and coexist with many bands on many
different levels. There is nothing the
Authors can do but accept that reality and determine to work it into their
model. Most importantly, the Authors
seem to have an unexpressed, perhaps even unconscious need to “assimilate”
through acculturation when they need to take the moral high ground work to understand and allow or make room for
the new cultures and its impacts rather than to guide individuals through the
process. Perhaps the Authors’
dissatisfaction with Postmodern constructs is simply that they are having a
hard time accepting the reality Postmodernism exposes, whether on a social, a
political or a technocratic level. But,
we have helped point them into a few directions to help ease their way and that
of those whom they are seeking to help.
Parekkadan, Benny, Historical Perspectives on Toleration: The Dutch Republic in the 16th and early 17th Century, NEH Summer Seminar, 2005, History Department, John P. Stevens H.S., Edison, NJ, 2005.
Schwartz, Seth, Montgomery, Marilyn and Briones, Ervin, The Role of Identity in Acculturation and Assimilation of Immigrant People: Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Questions, and Applied Recommendations,Human Development 2006; 49, 1-30, Miami, FL, 2006.Wall, Steven, Evolution of the Bruderthaler Mennonite Culture and De-volution of the Historical Evangelical Anabaptist Faith, Evanston Mennonite Church, Evanston, IL, 2010.
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